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ABSTRACT 
The “Southwest effect” - a large decrease in fares paired with an increase in traffic - has been 
discussed around the airline industry since the term was first coined in a government study in 
the early 1990s. But the airline industry has drastically changed since then - Southwest has 
become the largest domestic airline, and many of its competitors have had the chance to 
restructure through bankruptcy. 
 
This study examines some of Southwest's latest city additions, as well as a few of the airline’s 
intra-California routes where it is now a dominant player. Using publically-available 
government data, the change in passengers and average fare was measured. The change in 
average fare was also evaluated with a two-sample t-test, while the difference in distribution 
of fares was evaluated with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. The results indicate that Southwest 
can stimulate traffic and lower fares, the effect of its entrance into a new market decreases 
over time. In addition, an analysis of some key intra-California routes indicates that the 
opposite of the “Southwest effect” can happen once Southwest becomes the dominant player 
on a route. 
INTRODUCTION 
Since its founding forty years ago, Southwest Airlines has been known for launching 
aggressive levels of service in short-haul, point-to-point markets across the country, such as 
routes within Texas and California. On many of these routes, significant increases in 
passenger volumes are paired with large decreases in average fares. A 1993 paper from the 
Department of Transportation’s Office of Aviation Analysis labeled these market shifts as the 
“Southwest Effect.” 
 
There has been little research on this phenomenon in recent years. Since the paper’s original 
publication, Southwest’s route network has drastically changed. The carrier has entered new 
regions of the country, such as the Northeast in the mid-1990s, and has also begun flying 
longer routes. In fact, the airline’s average stage length has increased by more than 33% over 
the past ten years. 
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In addition, in recent years Southwest has re-tooled its revenue management 
techniques,started carrying more connecting passengers, and rationalized capacity in some 
markets in response to higher fuel prices and a generally weak national economy. Meanwhile, 
the carrier has also launched service to markets it has typically avoided, such as Boston, New 
York-LaGuardia, and Philadelphia. 
 
In addition, Southwest’s costs have evolved as the carrier has grown.Perhaps more 
importantly, major airlines like Delta, United, and most recently, American, have had the 
chance to adjust their cost structures during the bankruptcy process, affecting Southwest’s 
competitive edge in the process. In a recent letter to employees, Southwest CEO Gary Kelly 
said the airline must bring “costs down through increased productivity to compete against 
these new legacy airlines.” He also wrote: “Their costs are much lower than they were. Their 
labor costs are lower than ours. Actually, they aren't what you would call legacy airlines. 
They are new. They are different. The old legacy airlines are dead and buried,” (Maxon, 
2011). 
 
With these events in mind, further research of the “Southwest Effect” seems is quite 
appropriate. The topic is constantly discussed in various forms of media when Southwest 
launches a new market (Grantham, 2010). The “Southwest Effect” has also been referred to 
by Southwest management in certain political dealings(Securities and Exchange Commission, 
2011). 
 
There also appears to be a gap in the research of this phenomenon. Based on a literature 
review, it appears that most researchers have focused on the entry of Southwest, or another 
low-cost carrier, on a market, but have not thoroughly examined the long-term effects of 
Southwest’s presence in a market, especially one where incumbent carriers exit in the face of 
new competition. The original researchers of the Southwest Effect expressed concern about 
such a scenario, arguing that “without a competitive discipline, over time Southwest's fares 
will increase to cover cost inefficiencies that will creep in, and to extract monopoly profits,” 
(Bennett & Craun, 1993). 
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This capstone project will analyze multiple Southwest markets, but will largely focus on 
Southwest’s new markets, like Boston, New York-LaGuardia, Minneapolis, and Milwaukee. 
Here one could examine the effects of Southwest’s entry into a new route where it did not 
already have a significant presence in one of the cities. Also included in the analysis is 
Southwest’s intra-California service, which was the main subject of the original “Southwest 
Effect” research. Southwest’s market share in these markets has greatly increased since the 
initial study, especially as other airlines like United have cut their competition with Southwest 
on these routes. Also included will be some of Southwest’s short-haul routes out of 
Philadelphia, a market where Southwest has begun trimming its schedule(O'Tolle, 2011). A 
study of these routes is useful in determining how the Southwest effect has changed over 
time. 
 
Previous studies have focused on the entrance of Southwest in airline markets. This research 
will examine the long-term effects of Southwest’s entrance, to see if the initial stimulus 
persists for a significant amount of time, especially if competing carriers reduce or eliminate 
their presence on a route in response to the entry of Southwest. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
A 1993 research paper written by Randall D. Bennett and James M. Craun (1993) of the 
Department of Transportation’s Office of Aviation Analysis was the first to coin the term 
“Southwest effect,” a decrease in average fare and increase in volume after Southwest 
launches a new route. The two researchers utilize many examples of intra-California routes to 
display this phenomenon. For example, they note that the average fare on flights from 
Oakland to Ontario decreased 60%, while traffic increased 300% (Bennett & Craun, 1993, p. 
7). 
 
Bennett and Craun show that Southwest’s growth had major effects throughout the entire 
industry by comparing the average fares for markets of certain stage lengths to the 
government-calculated Standard Industry Fare Level. They note a dramatic decline in industry 
short-haul fares(Bennett & Craun, 1993, p. 5). 
 
The researchers note that Southwest’s low prices are made possible thanks to a significant 
cost advantage relative to other airlines. The carrier with the costs closest to Southwest, 
America West, had stage-length adjusted unit costs 20% higher than Southwest. Costs for 
other airlines were about 50-70% higher than Southwest (Bennett & Craun, 1993, p. 3). 
 
Bennett and Craun also express concern about Southwest’s actions in a market over the long-
term. They warn that after Southwest dominates a market, the airline could begin raising 
fares. To avoid such a situation, they advocate for additional competition in these markets 
(Bennett and Craun, 1993, p. 9). 
 
Timothy M. Vowles(2001) examines Southwest’s effect on cities that are served by more than 
one airport. Southwest has often utilized alternate airports to serve other cities, such as 
Baltimore to serve the Washington, DC area.(Since publication of the study, Southwest has 
launched service to Washington-Dulles, thought its operation there is much smaller than 
Baltimore’s.) Vowles proposes that Southwest’s entrance at an alternate airport can have an 
effect on the main airports. For example, after Southwest launched service from Providence to 
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Baltimore, fares to Washington-Dulles and Washington-National also decreased (Vowles 
255). Vowles also examines markets with service to both Chicago O’Hare (a hub for 
American and United) and Chicago Midway (one of Southwest’s largest focus city). Vowles 
notes that traffic between Louisville and Chicago Midway increased 6431%, while traffic to 
O’Hare declined despite fares being cut in half (Vowles, 2001, p. 256). 
 
In their paper “City Pairs vs. Airport Pairs: A Market-Definition Methodology of the Airline 
Industry,”Jan K. Brueckner, Darin Lee, and Ethan Singer(2010) examine the effects of LCCs 
on alternate airports, such as Manchester and Providence on Boston. Such research is useful 
as Southwest has avoided some major airports. For example, the airline serves the Miami area 
through Ft. Lauderdale and West Palm Beach. The research attempts to determine if some of 
these alternate airports should be grouped together to make up one market, a question that is 
very important for domestic aviation regulatory policy. Such research also implies how much 
an effect Southwest’s presence at alternate airports has on airports served by legacy carriers. 
They find that in some cases, alternate airports should not be grouped with major airports, 
such as Providence and Manchester and Boston. But in some cases, airports like Miami and 
Fort Lauderdale should be grouped together, though West Palm Beach should be considered 
independent(Brueckner, Lee, & Singer, City-Pairs vs. Airport-Pairs: A Market-Definition 
Methodology for the Airline Industry, 2010, p. 42). 
 
D.E Pitfield’s (2008) study, “The Southwest Effect: A time-series analysis on passengers 
carried by selected routes and a market share comparison,” attempts to quantify the effects of 
Southwest’s entry into a market using statistical models. It is especially worthy of note as the 
paper is one of the most recent research papers on the “Southwest Effect.” Pitfield’s research 
primarily focuses on market share data on five routes, and finds that Southwest is able to 
quickly grow its share in some markets. In two cases, Southwest’s market share nears 
20%(Pitfield, 2008, p. 119). 
 
Pitfield’s data, however, is based on the Department of Transportation’s T-100 Domestic 
Market data set, which could distort market share numbers. For example, Southwest might 
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have a flight from Chicago (Midway) to Baltimore that continues on to Orlando. If I were to 
examine the Chicago – Baltimore data in T-100 Market, passengers that continue on to 
Orlando would be excluded. All passengers that deplane in Baltimore, however, are counted, 
including those connecting onto other flights. On city pairs like Chicago-Washington in 
Pitfield’s study, connecting traffic might be a large portion of passenger volume and affect 
market share data. This factor is especially worthy of consideration in this market, especially 
as both American and United operate hubs at Chicago O’Hare. Replicating this study with the 
DOT’s DB1B data set, which tracks origin and destination (O&D) passengers could be a 
better choice that yields some interesting results. 
 
Research from Austan Goolsbee and Chad Syverson (2004) indicates that Southwest need not 
provide nonstop service on a route to provide fare relief consumers, as existing carriers will 
adjust their pricing to the threat of new competition: 
 
…incumbents do indeed react to the threat of Southwest’s entry before actual 
entry takes place. Incumbents drop fares significantly in anticipation of entry. 
This is not simply due to airport-specific cost shocks because fares drop on 
threatened routes relative to incumbents’ fares on other routes from the same 
airports. The fare declines are accompanied by a sizable increase in the number 
of passengers flying the incumbents’ threatened routes. The fare decreases are 
largest for routes that are concentrated beforehand, but do not decrease at all 
for routes into neighboring airports in the same MSA (i.e., where Southwest is 
not directly threatening entry). There is only weak evidence that the 
incumbents expand capacity (the number of available seats and flights), but 
there is strong evidence that load factors increaseon those flights they 
have…The findings of this paper suggest that Southwest Airlines has a 
powerful competitive effect in the U.S. passenger airline industry, and that this 
effect does not operate solely through Southwest’s head-to-head competition 
with major carriers (Gooslbee and Syverson, 2004, p. 17). 
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Overall, the two researchers find in markets where Southwest begins competing with a legacy 
carrier, fares are lowered by 26% (Gooslbee and Syverson, 2004, p. 9). 
 
Recent research byJan K. Brueckner, Darin Lee, and Ethan Singer (2010)in their paper 
“Airline Competition and Domestic U.S. Airfares: A Comprehensive Reappraisal” examined 
the effect of low cost carriers on average fares. While many studies have focused solely on 
Southwest, this paper examines on other low cost carriers, such as AirTran, Frontier, and 
JetBlue, as well. They find that LCC competition significantly reduces fares, but that 
Southwest often reduces fares the most: 
 
Several broad conclusions emerge from the empirical analysis. First, the 
impact of LCC competition is dramatic. The presence of in-market, nonstop 
LCC competition reduces fares by as much as 34 percent in the nonstop 
markets, and adjacent LCC competition in these markets reduces fares by as 
much as 19 percent. The strongest effects come from Southwest, which is 
usually separated from other LCCs in the regressions. By contrast, the effect of 
legacy competition is slight. An additional legacy carrier providing nonstop 
service lowers fares by at most 4.1 percent in the nonstop markets, with no 
effect in some specifications. When an additional legacy carrier offers adjacent 
nonstop service, the fare impact in the nonstop markets is insignificantly 
different from zero in many specifications(Brueckner, Lee, & Singer, Airline 
Competition and Domestic U.S. Airfares: A Comprehensive Reappraisal, 
2010, p. 5). 
 
Depending on the model used by the researchers, Southwest’s impact relative to other LCCs 
is significant. One model for nonstop flights suggests that Southwest’s presence lowers fares 
about 28%, while the reduction for other LCCs is 13% (Brueckner, Lee, & Singer, Airline 
Competition and Domestic U.S. Airfares: A Comprehensive Reappraisal, 2010, p. 20). 
 
An October 2011 paper by Kerry M. Tan (2011) also examines the effects of a low-cost-
carrier’s entry into a new market, and notes that the simulative effects in an airline market 
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brought about by the entry of Southwest can similarly occur when other airlines enter, writing 
that “JetBlue Airways and AirTran Airways demonstrate how other low-cost carriers can 
mirror the entry effects exhibited with Southwest Airlines.”Tan also argues that the “the 
Southwest Effect can no longer be considered as a special case relevant to one particular 
airline, particularly as it pertains to legacy carrier incumbents” and that “the entry effect 
pertains to low-cost carriersin general,” (Tan, 2011, p. 16).Tan notes, however, that in general 
Southwest tends to have the greatest effect on pricing of all incumbents when it enters a 
market: 
 
“…incumbents tend to decrease their mean airfares the quarter before entry, 
the quarter of entry, and the quarter after entry. Southwest Airlines had the 
largest average entry effect, with the aforementioned result of inducing 
incumbents to decrease prices by 12.24%, on average, the quarter after actual 
entry. Other low-cost carriers had similar, yet weaker effects. AirTran Airways 
induced a decrease of 10.81%, while incumbents also reacted to entry by 
JetBlue Airways and Spirit Airlines, but only by a modest amount of 5.57% 
and 5.36%, respectively. Nevertheless, each low-cost carrierinduced 
incumbents to decrease their prices before and after actual entry,” (Tan, 2011, 
p. 14). 
 
Tan’s analysis examines the twelve quarters prior to entry, the quarter of entry, and the 
following twelve quarters. Interestingly, the effect of Southwest’s entrance into a 
market diminishes over time, though a statistically significant decrease in fares is still 
observed. 
 
Tan further examines the response of legacy carriers when low-cost carriers like Southwest, 
JetBlue, or Spirit enter a market and finds that they “respond to entry by low-cost carriers by 
dramatically decreasing their average airfares,” and that the response of legacy carriers to 
low-cost carriers is greater than recorded when all types of incumbent carriers are considered 
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(Tan, 2011, p. 14). Interestingly, Tan discovers that the strongest response by legacy carriers 
is seen when AirTran, recently acquired by Southwest, enters a new market: 
 
“Southwest Airlines induces incumbents to decrease their average prices by 
13.09%. However, AirTran Airways induces an even stronger effect than that 
of Southwest as incumbents cut their mean airfare by an average of 13.31% the 
quarter after AirTran Airways actually enters a route. Entry by JetBlueAirways 
and Spirit Airlines invokeslegacy carrier incumbents to decrease their prices by 
7.07% and 7.98%, respectively,” (Tan, 2011, p. 14). 
 
Tan also analyzes the DB1B data to estimate the effect on entry of a low-cost carrier on low-
cost carrier incumbents, and finds that “low-cost carrier incumbents do not significantly alter 
their mean airfare.” 
 
In addition to examining mean airfares, Tan also looks at changes in 10th percentile airfare 
and the 90thpercentile airfare in response to low-cost carrier entry. Airlines typically offer 
numerous fare buckets in any given market, and can potentially adjust some more than others 
in response to a new-entrant competitor. For example, discount fares (perhaps located in the 
10th percentile) might be lowered more in response to new entrants, while not changing higher 
(sometimes refundable) fares in the 90th percentile. Like the decrease in mean airfares, Tan 
notices a significant decrease in fares charged by legacy carriers in response to LCC entry: 
 
“...legacy carrier incumbents slash their 10th percentile prices 
immediatelybefore and immediately after entry. In the quarter after Southwest 
Airlines actually enters aroute, legacy carrier incumbents decreased their 10th 
percentile prices by 11.56%, on average,relative to the excluded period (the 
thirteenth to sixteenth quarter before entry). Other low-cost entrants induced 
similar effects, with legacy carrier incumbents dropping prices by an average 
of8.09%, 7.49%, and 7.69% when AirTran Airways, JetBlue Airways, and 
Spirit Airlines entered the route, respectively. These results suggest that legacy 
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carrier incumbents significantly decreasetheir discount prices in response to 
entry by a low-cost carrier,” (Tan, 2011, p. 17). 
 
The analysis of 10th percentile fares for LCCs in response to the entrance of another LCC are 
similar to what was seen in mean airfares. Tan reports that “low-cost carriers do not 
significantly alter their 10th percentile prices in response to entry by a rival low-cost 
carrier,”(Tan, 2011, p. 17). 
 
Tan notes similar effects in the 90th percentile, or highest, fares: 
 
“Southwest Airlines induces legacy carrier incumbents to decrease their 90th 
percentile prices by 14.86%, while legacy carriers decreased their 90th 
percentile price by 14.68% and 14.05% in the quarter after actual entry by 
AirTran Airways and Spirit Airlines, respectively. Interestingly, these effects 
are of similar magnitudes than that on the 10th percentile prices. Full fare 
prices charged by legacy carriers decreased by 3.35%, on average, in response 
to entry by JetBlue Airways. Although this is not as strong as their effect on 
10th percentile prices, entry by JetBlue Airways still put downward pressure 
on the incumbents’ full fare prices,” (Tan, 2011, p. 18). 
 
Tan also notes, however, that in terms of 90thpercentile fares, “low-cost carriers do not 
strongly respond to entry” by another LCC. 
 
Charles Boguslaski, Harumi Ito, and Darin Lee in a 2004 study attempts to evaluate 
Southwest’s entry decisions into a market, and notes that over the course of the 1990s 
Southwest’s market entry decisions changed over time: 
 
After successfully exploiting a number of very dense short-haul markets, 
Southwest expanded into medium-haul vacation markets by tapping into many 
customers who had previously not traveled on these routes. We also found that 
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starting in 1995, Southwest began entering into a number of relatively thin, 
long-haul markets that it had previously avoided. Likewise, we found that 
Southwest’s entry decisions during the latter half of the 1990s became more 
strongly influenced by network effects. However, Southwest’s network is 
markedly different from that of traditional hub-and-spoke carriers, in that their 
route system tendsto be far less concentrated,” (Boguslaski, Ito, & Lee, 2004, 
p. 349). 
 
Like other researchers, Kai Hüschelrath and Kathrin Müller explain in a 2011 paper that other 
LCCs, not just Southwest, can stimulate markets they enter: 
 
“…our analysis suggested that, first, Southwest cannot be considered as the 
only significant low-cost carrier anymore since several other members of this 
group showed equal or even more significant effects of entry. Although it 
seems likely that part of this result is driven by Southwest’s (and JetBlue’s) 
outstanding reputation – leading the respective incumbent carriers to 
substantial price reductions as soon as it becomes sufficiently likely that one of 
those carriers will eventually enter the respective route (i.e., before the actual 
entry event) – entries by other low-cost carriers are found to cause substantial 
drops in the average market yield in the quarter of entry. Second, due to its 
merger with the low-cost carrier America West in 2005, US Airways must be 
considered as a hybrid carrier positioned between network carriers  and low-
cost carriers,” ( Hüschelrat & Müller, 2011, p. 27). 
 
It is worth noting, however, that these authors write that in their “empirical analysis of entry 
patterns and effects of entry, regional airlines are excluded from the analysis,” and argue that 
“most of those smaller airlines operate in small feeder traffic markets,”( Hüschelrat & Müller, 
2011, p. 5). Such a statement has become less true over the year as the regional airline 
industry has dramatically shifted over the past decade. 
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Mainline carriers have been able to reach agreements with their pilot unions that allows for 
the flying of larger (roughly 70-90 seats) regional jets by outsourced airlines. In addition, 
American, Delta, United, and US Airways have added first class seating to at least a portion 
of their larger regional aircraft, harmonizing the product with mainline service. Mainline 
carriers have used such aircraft to enter into large business markets, such as Delta Air Lines’ 
shuttle service from Chicago-O’Hare to New York-LaGuardia.  
 
By excluding regional carriers, these researchers have potentially ignored market entries by 
mainline carriers, and have also ignored the possibility of mainline carriers mixing regional 
service with their own. For example, comparing Southwest’s performance in the Providence-
Philadelphia market with US Airways while ignoring regional carriers would exclude most of 
US Airways’ capacity in the market from the analysis. 
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METHODOLOGY 
This capstone project will utilize multiple Department of Transportation (DOT) data sources 
to analyze Southwest’s passenger volume, revenue, and costs. DOT-published data is not only 
comprehensive and free, but is also utilized by many other academic research papers covering 
the airline industry.  
 
The quarterly Origin and Destination survey (DB1B) data set, the most important for use in 
this study, is based on a 10% sample of all airline tickets and contains fare and routing 
information on individual itineraries. This database contains a sample of itineraries across the 
country, and contains the number of passengers and fare for each itinerary. This data can then 
be aggregated to calculate the average fare in a market and the total number of origin and 
destination (O&D) passengers traveling between two cities. 
 
DB1B also contains fields to filter out connecting itineraries, which is useful as this study will 
focus on direct flights. The DOT includes other useful fields to help filter the data. For 
example, the government agency flags certain itineraries with “non-credible” fares, which are 
usually quite high outliers. Itineraries with multiple ticketing carriers (interline itineraries) and 
bulk fares have also been eliminated. 
 
It is very important that only O&D passengers be considered for this study, as raw traffic 
numbers will skew the results. For example, solely examining the traffic numbers on the 
Providence-Philadelphia route after Southwest’s entry would not provide meaningful results. 
Many of the passengers flying this route on US Airways are connecting to other cities in the 
US Airways network, and as such are not impacted by Southwest’s entry in the route. It is 
only valid to study passengers who are actually flying between the two cities. 
 
While average fares are certainly interesting and worthwhile to examine for this research, it 
will also be useful to examine the distribution of fares in a market. A wider distribution of 
fares charged in a market could be an indicator of Southwest’s attempt to more effectively 
utilize revenue management techniques to exact the highest revenue possible from passengers. 
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The most basic way to test for the presence of the “Southwest effect” is to look for the 
percentage change in passengers (listed as pax in data tables) and average fares. In addition, 
two types of statistical tests have been used to aid the analysis of the selected markets. The 
first is the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test, which will be used to compare the empirical 
distribution functions of fares from two different time periods. The test generates the statistic 
D, or the maximum distance between the two distribution functions. As such, higher levels of 
D would be expected when the greatest change in fares seen. A simple pooled two-sample t-
test is also used to examine the magnitude and significance of the change in fare. 
RESULTS 
Boston 
 
Market 
Base 
Period 
Comp 
Period 
Pax 
Change 
Avg. 
Fare 
Change 
D 
KS p‐
value 
T score 
T P‐
value 
BWI  20091  20101  149.1%  ‐27.4%  0.221118 <.0001  48.78  <.0001 
BWI  20091  20111  98.4%  ‐25.9%  0.326721 <.0001  40.08  <.0001 
CHI*  20091  20111  42.8%  ‐21.3%  0.305002 <.0001  35.30  <.0001 
CHI*  20091  20111  36.4%  ‐4.4%  0.137670 <.0001  6.93  <.0001 
DEN  20092  20102  41.8%  ‐10.8%  0.253779 <.0001  12.98  <.0001 
DEN  20092  20112  51.8%  ‐6.1%  0.214994 <.0001  7.64  <.0001 
PHX  20101  20111  81.2%  ‐23.8%  0.322618 <.0001  16.41  <.0001 
STL  20092  20102  ‐10.5%  16.3%  0.301967 <.0001  ‐10.91  <.0001 
STL  20092  20112  ‐33.8%  27.0%  0.519334 <.0001  ‐17.52  <.0001 
PHL  20094  20104  510.1%  ‐52.8%  0.455430 <.0001  84.35  <.0001 
*Includes MDW and ORD 
 
For over a decade, Southwest did not serve Boston and told its customers to fly into 
Providence or Manchester instead. In 2009, however, the airline changed its mind and began 
serving Boston, initially from Baltimore (BWI) and Chicago-Midway (MDW), and service to 
other cities followed. 
 
 
Philadelphia experienced the largest increase in passengers and the largest (and most 
significant) decrease in fares. This market alone would indicate that the “Southwest effect” is 
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alive and well, and that Southwest can certainly stimulate a market when it wants to. But 
Southwest eventually decided to cease service on the route earlier this year, suggesting that 
the low fares being charged were the airline were not particularly sustainable. 
 
Baltimore also experienced an increase in passengers and the biggest decrease in fares. Such a 
result is not surprising, especially since JetBlue began service on the route later in 2009. It 
should be noticed, however, that the increase in passengers and decrease in fares was less in 
the next period compared. A similar situation can be found in the Denver market. 
In one market, St. Louis, passengers decreased and fares increased after Southwest’s entrance. 
Some of this change could perhaps be attributed to American’s dropping of the route. Today, 
Southwest is the only airline to serve the city pair. 
 
The Chicago market is also notable – as one would expect, passenger numbers rose and fares 
decreased after Southwest’s entry. The difference in fares, shrunk significantly as the market 
matured. For example, the t-score for fare difference was 35.30 for a comparison of 2009 with 
2010, but it shrunk to 6.93 for 2009 and 2011. The distribution of fares also shows this 
change. The 2010 fare distribution (the green line) is much further to the left than the 2009 
distribution (the blue line), but the 2011 distribution is much closer to 2009 levels.The D 
statistic generated by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test confirms this, as distance from the 2009 
distribution decreased from 0.31 in 2010 to 0.14 in 2011. 
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Milwaukee 
Market 
Base 
Period 
Comp 
Period 
Pax 
Change 
Avg. 
Fare 
Change 
D 
KS 
P‐value 
T score 
T P‐
value 
BWI  20091  20101  50.77%  0.70%  0.111385 <.0001  ‐0.63  0.5259 
BWI  20091  20111  25.65%  24.19%  0.410165 <.0001  ‐16.62  <.0001 
MCI  20091  20101  197.30%  ‐53.03%  0.571590 <.0001  36.39  <.0001 
MCI  20091  20111  160.92%  ‐44.95%  0.409495 <.0001  29.18  <.0001 
MCO  20091  20101  27.92%  ‐10.93%  0.254915 <.0001  19.31  <.0001 
MCO  20091  20111  28.06%  ‐1.30%  0.159703 <.0001  2.13  0.0335 
 
Southwest entered Milwaukee during a time of heated competition, as AirTran had quickly 
built up a Milwaukee focus city that competed with Midwest Airlines’ hub. AirTran’s 
presence seems to have tempered the effects of Southwest’s entrance. The change in average 
fares to Orlando, a city served by both Midwest and AirTran, was not particularly 
drastic.There was also passenger growth to Baltimore (where AirTran was the only 
competitor), but average fares were essentially unchanged between the first quarter of 2009 
and 2010. In addition, there was not a large change in the distribution of fares. 
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The largest changes in the average fare, number of passengers, and distance between fare 
distributions was seen on the Kansas City route, where Southwest was only competing with 
Midwest. While only a few routes are being analyzed here, the changes in the Milwaukee 
market indicate that at some times, the effects of a Southwest entry are minimized by the 
presence of another low-cost carrier. 
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Minneapolis-St. Paul 
Market 
Base 
Period 
Comp 
Period 
Pax 
Change 
Avg. 
Fare 
Change 
D 
KS 
P‐value 
T score 
T P‐
value 
CHI  20083  20093  53.00%  ‐61.54%  0.728878 <.0001  193.79  <.0001 
CHI  20083  20103  40.15%  ‐50.27%  0.622310 <.0001  147.43  <.0001 
CHI  20083  20113  34.36%  ‐44.41%  0.509076 <.0001  125.85  <.0001 
STL  20092  20102  44.06%  ‐19.47%  0.250479 <.0001  18.70  <.0001 
STL  20092  20112  41.10%  ‐17.32%  0.332355 <.0001  15.89  <.0001 
DEN  20091  20101  22.05%  ‐12.51%  0.312960 <.0001  22.00  <.0001 
DEN  20091  20111  31.15%  ‐3.51%  0.246585 <.0001  5.34  <.0001 
 
It is clear that Southwest stimulated traffic from Minneapolis to Chicago and St. Louis, and 
also significantly reduced fares. These two effects, however, became more muted as time 
passed. In addition, according to the D statistic generated by the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test 
decreased as time passed, showing that the distance between two fare distributions decreased 
as the markets developed further. 
 
Of the three markets examined, Denver experienced the smallest increases and passengers and 
decreases in fare. This effect could perhaps be attributed to the fact that Frontier Airlines, 
another low cost carrier, was also serving the market. Like the Milwaukee-Orlando and 
Milwaukee-Baltimore examples, the results in this market suggest that the effect of 
Southwest’s entry is more muted when low-cost carriers are already providing competition. 
 
New York-LaGuardia (LGA) 
Southwest started service from LaGuardia in 2009 with service to Baltimore and Chicago-
Midway. LaGuardia is one of the few slot-controlled airports in the United States, and as a 
result it is very difficult to obtain access. Southwest was able to acquire LaGuardia slots from 
bankrupt carrier ATA Airlines to start eight daily flights. 
 
Market 
Base 
Period 
Comp 
Period 
Pax 
Change 
Avg. 
Fare 
Change 
D 
KS 
P‐value 
T score 
T P‐
value 
BWI  20091  20101  667.92%  ‐36.58%  0.500440 <.0001  10.68  <.0001 
BWI  20091  20111  292.45%  ‐26.62%  0.516464 <.0001  6.88  <.0001 
CHI  20091  20101  49.29%  ‐24.93%  0.433096 <.0001  59.21  <.0001 
CHI  20091  20111  58.65%  ‐12.00%  0.188263 <.0001  30.23  <.0001 
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Baltimore-LaGuardia is an outlier in this study because there were huge increases in traffic 
paired with higher fares. This result is likely due to the fact that there was very little capacity 
between the two cities. Once Southwest entered the markets, some passengers may have 
switched from flying to other (higher-fare) flights to other Washington, DC airports to 
Baltimore instead. Nevertheless, the huge traffic increases decreased as Southwest raised fares 
further. 
 
Southwest’s entrance into the LaGuardia-Chicago market certainly stimulated it, providing 
passenger growth and fare decreases that were highly statistically significant. Fares began to 
rise again, however, as the market began to mature. 
 
Newark 
The Department of Justice required that some slots at Newark be divested in order for the 
merger between Continental and United to be approved. As a result, a deal was struck for 
Southwest to receive the slots and begin service. Southwest first launched service to Chicago 
and St. Louis. 
 
Market 
Base 
Period 
Comp 
Period 
Pax 
Change 
Avg. 
Fare 
Change 
D 
KS 
P‐value 
T score 
T P‐
value 
CHI  20103  20113  23.90%  ‐8.77%  0.213975 <.0001  14.63  <.0001 
STL  20103  20113  95.94%  ‐32.90%  0.303105 <.0001  26.66  <.0001 
 
Southwest stimulated both markets, but the effects of its entry were greater in St. Louis. The 
greater effect in this market could be attributed to the competitive situation on these routes: 
Chicago is served by both United and American, while St. Louis is only served United.  
It should be noted, however, that Southwest’s Newark station has been open for slightly more 
than a year, and as a result this market should be re-visited in the future. At the time of this 
writing, there is not enough data to examine some of the other markets served from Newark, 
like Denver and Houston. 
 
Oakland 
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This study has primarily focused on Southwest’s new markets, but three major Oakland routes 
were also examined to link this research back to prior examinations of Southwest. The 
original DOT study that coined the term “Southwest Effect” focused on intra-California 
routes, many of which involved Oakland.  The authors of the study, NAMES, warned that the 
“Southwest Effect” could wear off over time. “Without a competitive discipline, over time 
Southwest's fares will increase to cover cost inefficiencies that will creep in, and to extract 
monopoly profits,” they argued. 
 
The intra-California market has shifted greatly since the Southwest effect was originally 
studied, as legacy competitors have reduced their presence. United Airlines, for example, had 
created the airline-within-an airline United Shuttle to better compete with Southwest, but 
ended up dropping the concept. As a result, Southwest was left with a monopoly on many 
routes. Three major intra-California markets were examined to judge recent developments: 
 
Market 
Base 
Period 
Comp 
Period 
Pax 
Change 
Avg. 
Fare 
Change 
D 
KS 
P‐value 
T score 
T P‐
value 
LAX  20053  20073  ‐10.28%  ‐0.71%  0.357053 <.0001  2.91  .0036 
LAX  20053  20093  ‐49.75%  13.27%  0.397915 <.0001  ‐44.70  <.0001 
LAX  20053  20113  ‐53.39%  42.56%  .524078  <.0001  ‐117.81  <.0001 
ONT  20053  20073  ‐3.83%  ‐2.11%  0.291614 <.0001  7.12  <.0001 
ONT  20053  20093  ‐33.64%  13.08%  0.35046  <.0001  ‐34.48  <.0001 
ONT  20053  20113  ‐42.93%  48.20%  0.555755 <.0001  ‐104.17  <.0001 
BUR  20053  20073  2.56%  ‐2.54%  0.375436 <.0001  11.46  <.0001 
BUR  20053  20093  ‐21.05%  12.14%  0.438665 <.0001  ‐40.58  <.0001 
BUR  20053  20113  ‐29.89%  41.26%  0.598319 <.0001  ‐125.03  <.0001 
 
All three markets have seen passengers decrease along with fare increases of increasing 
significance. In addition, the D statistic increased in each market, showing an increased 
difference in the fare distributions. In all three markets, Southwest either now has a monopoly 
or carries the vast majority of passengers. The results in these three markets would indicate 
that the authors’ concerns over 20 years ago were justified. 
 
Of particular note is the significant decline in passengers on the Oakland-Los Angeles route is 
attributable to multiple factors. Increasing fares on the route could certainly temper demand, 
The Evolution of the “Southwest Effect” 
Senior Capstone Project for Daniel Webb 
but increased competition on the San Francisco-Los Angeles route is another factor. 
Southwest resumed service at San Francisco in late 2007, and its initial batch of destinations 
included Los Angeles. Start-up carrier Virgin America inaugurated service in the same year, 
and Delta entered the market in 2009. 
 
Since more airlines have started the SFO-LAX route and some have ended the OAK-LAX 
route, the relationship between the two routes has greatly changed. Early last decade, there 
were significantly lower fares on the OAK-LAX route, and many more passengers flew this 
routing than SFO-LAX. Today, however, the opposite is true: OAK-LAX fares are higher, 
and more passengers fly SFO-LAX. 
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The distribution of fares in the intra-California markets also experienced changes. For 
example, there was very little variation in fare, especially among higher fares, in the Oakland-
Ontario market in 2005. The distribution of fares in 2011 is quite different. The standard 
deviation of fare in the third quarter of 2011 was $47.10, more than double its 2005 value. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Only a sliver of Southwest’s massive network was examined in this study, but many 
important conclusions can be drawn. First, Southwest has continued to stimulate traffic and 
lower fares on some of its new routes, but these effects appear to wear off after time as these 
new markets mature. In addition, these affects can be muted if strong competition, especially 
from a low-cost carrier, already exists on a route. Additional analysis indicates that once 
Southwest dominates a market, the carrier begins to increase prices, resulting in decreased 
demand. 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
In an industry as dynamic as the airlines, there are always opportunities for further research of 
many topics. One interesting topic is the expansion of Spirit Airlines, which calls itself an 
ULCC, or ultra-low cost carrier. The airline has recently added flights that compete with 
Southwest’s in markets like Chicago-Minneapolis and Los Angeles-Las Vegas. The fact that 
another airline is now attempting to undercut Southwest shows how much Southwest has 
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changed over the past few years. Much of Spirit’s domestic expansion, however, has been 
very recent, and as a result there is not much government data to study. 
 
Southwest’s acquisition of AirTran last year will also provide an opportunity for further 
research, especially in terms of judging how Southwest adjusts AirTran’s business model. 
While there have already been plenty of changes, especially the elimination of service at 
many smaller airports, many steps in the integration remain. For example, Southwest 
continues to maintain the AirTran brand, and passengers are still not able to connect between 
the networks of the two airlines. 
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